THE IMPLICATION OF INNOVATION STRATEGY TOWARDS CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS: A STUDY IN INDONESIAN MANUFACTURING COMPANIES by Santi, Fitri & Ridwan, Nurazi
 1 
THE IMPLICATION OF INNOVATION STRATEGY 
TOWARDS CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS: A 








Fitri Santi, SE, M.S.M 
Department of Management 
Faculty of Economics  








Dr. Ridwan Nurazi, SE, M.Sc. 
Department of Management 
Faculty of Economics  
































This explanatory study uses the panel data analysis to test the influence of innovation 
strategy on firm‟s capital structure. This study has three objectives. Firstly, the 
empirical investigation will assess the extent to which Indonesian manufacturing 
companies listed in BEI investing their money to R&D activities as the way to be an 
innovator in their industry. Secondly, we will investigate the role of innovation strategy 
in explaining the capital structure decision. Finally, the study will also examine the 
relationship between the interaction of innovation strategy and firm‟s profitability 
toward capital structure decision. 
 
Previous study suggest that firms pursuing an innovation strategy require a certain level 
of equity that provide a financial buffer to ensure stability and availability of funds for 
research efforts, new product launches, and on-going development of knowledge based 
capabilities (O‟Brien, 2003). In other words, firms need to maintain their financial slack 
before decided to take innovation strategy as their grand strategy.  This paper is made 
by considering that corporate strategy can help in explaining the variation in capital 
structure choices made by manufacturing companies in Indonesia. In an Industry, 
competitive strategy forms that were chosen by managers will determine the strategic 
value of decision to retain their certain financial slacks.  
 
Using Annual Report data of 67 manufacturing companies from 2000 until 2005, this 
study confirms that financial slack be the important determinant for the firm to lead 
innovation strategy. Firms pursuing an innovation strategy have low financial leverage. 
This study also finds that the more important innovation for company strategy, the 
stronger the negative relationship between profitability and leverage will be.  
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A lot of research in capital structure has been doing recently (for example Harris 
& Raviv, 1991, Santi 2002), nevertheless, in empirical platform, there is less disclosure 
regarding how firms choose their capital structure between debt and equity. There is no 
clear-cut consensus among the corporates‟ executives on how the capital structure 
should be, what the determining factors are, or even, whether their financial decision 
really matters. In fact, the financing decisions are still surrounded by puzzles for many-
many years after the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Modigliani and 
Miller found that financing decisions and investing decisions were separating processes, 
and the strategy chosen by firms would influence the value of firms. This phenomenon 
would cause “capital structure puzzle” in finance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) have 
proposed a hypothesis that there was an interaction between investing decision and 
financing decision, so the opportunities to explore how a competitive strategy 
influenced capital structure become widely open. The choice of the firm‟s capital 
structure is generally considered a central strategic issue, and Balakrishnan and Fox 
(1993) argue that strategic management can improve our understanding of the capital 
structure decisions. 
 
Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) found that strategic aplication would explain in 
understanding capital structure in industries. The basic assumptions used in strategic 
management are that, in a certain industry, potential customers are heterogen in terms of 
needs and preferences so it will cause various customers segmentations. A firm that tries 
to satisfy or serve all market segmentations can not treat or serve well for the whole 
customers (Porter, 1996). Thus far, there are various variations in conquering market. A 
competitive strategy will lead to firms investing decision (Porter, 1996), and investing 
decision will influence financing decision chosen (Williamson, 1988). It can be 
concluded that different strategy chosen by firms will influence the variations of capital 
structure. The strategic argument of capital structure can explain “capital structure 
puzzle” in similar industries or in different industries. These arguments not only explain 
the variations among industries (Harris and Raviv, 1991) but also the variations of 
capital structures at the same industry. 
This study tries to fill in the gap by using panel data in analysis of financing 
decision and apply the appropriate model. This study uses Indonesian data set to assess 
how competitive strategy (applied to innovator firms in their industry) will influence the 
capital structure taken by specific firms. The previous research found that intensive 
investment on R&D (resarch and development) is associated with low leverage level 
since this investment creates intangible assets. This intangible asset can not become 
collateral in obtaining debt (Santi, 2002; Vincente-Lorente, 2001; Simerly & Li, 2000; 
Rajan & Zingales, 1995, and Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). In other words, firm 
investment intensity in R&D will influence the capital structure. From this argument, it 
 4 
can be proposed that “financial slack” (low leverage level) should be the primary 
priority for firms that compete based on innovation strategy. Competition based on 
innovation strategy should assure that:   
 Investment on R&D implemented continuously. 
 Fund needed for launching new products available at any time. 
 Firms can expand or develop through profitable acquisition or merger. 
 The suitable proxy for innovation strategy is not depending on intensity of 
investment in R&D, but the intensity level of firms‟ investment in R&D relative to their 
competitors at the same industry. As a whole, we propose that firms compete based on 
innovation strategy will decide “financial slack” as their strategic priority. The 
implication of this proposition is that if capital structure decision follows the firm 
strategy, there would be a significant low performance when a firm can not match 
between capital structure and firms‟ strategy. On the other words, when a firm fails to 
maintain its financial slack, it will impact the success of implementation of innovation 
strategy and the success of competition. 
 There are two main problems will be solved empirically in this research: 
 How important the influence of innovation strategy in firm‟s strategic scheme 
toward capital structure chosen by manufacturing firms? 
 Based on pecking order theory, high profitable firms tend to reduce their debt. In 
terms of strategy, does the influence of profitable firm toward leverage will be 
bigger to the firm that implemented innovation strategy compare to the firms that do 
not implement innovation strategy consistently in winning the competition? 
 
The objectives of this research are: 
 To study empirically the influence of innovation strategy toward firm‟s capital 
structure chosen. 
 To study the influence of interaction between innovation strategies toward firm‟s 
profitability level and firm‟s capital structure.  
 
This paper will be divided into five sections. Section 1 is introduction. The 
remaining sections are organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of literature 
on capital structure, Section 3 describes data and research methodology, Section 4 
reports results of the statistical analyses, and Section 5 summarizes the main 
conclusions of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
2.1 Traditional Perspective of Capital Structure 
 
The study of capital structure has been started by Modigliani and Miller in 1958. 
They argued that the value of the firm is independent of capital structure under certain 
conditions or assumptions. One important condition was perfect capital markets, i.e., no 
taxes, no transaction costs, and no bankruptcy costs. Another condition was information 
symmetry, i.e., investors and managers have equal information about the firm‟s 
potential investment. In a subsequent paper Modigliani and Miller (1963) eased the 
conditions and showed that under a capital market imperfection where interest expenses 
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are tax deductable, firm value will increase with higher financial leverage. In this 
situation, the optimal capital structure will be determined by a trade-off between 
increased bankruptcy risk from a higher debt load and the tax advantage associated with 
debt (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; La-Porta et.al., 2000; Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; Santi & 
Prijadi, 2006). Furthermore, Jensen & Meckling (1976) argued that not only the 
bankruptcy risk, the possibility of agency cost will also determine the firm optimal 
capital structure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also showed that there is cost of debt if 
equity holders using debt as their sources of funds. Since high risky project will damage 
bondholders, bondholders may ask protection through monitoring and bonding 
mechanism. 
 
Debt will reduce agency cost. Jensen (1986) argued that debt will reduce “free 
cash flows.” Free cash flow may control menager to use it for other than improving 
firm‟s value and shareholder‟s wealth. The potential of reducing agency cost and the 
benefit of using debt tax shield push the researchers to study whether optimal capital 
structure can balance the cost and benefit because of debt (Mahadwarta, 2006). Some 
empirical studies gave different results. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) found there 
was no possibility of optimal capital structure. Miller (1997) mentioned that there was 
no benefit using debt, and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) said there was other “tax 
shield” as a substitution of debt.  
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) proposed a quite different perspective namely ‘pecking 
order theory‟ of capital structure. According to pecking order perspective, there was no 
optimal capital structure. Asymmetry information cause firms prefer internal funding 
(e.g., from retained earnings) rather than external funding. If internal funds are lacking, 
then firms looking for riskier external funds (with the order of issuing obligation then 
issuing issuing stock). In sum, when firms‟ profitability reduces, debt level will 
increase, and when firms‟ profitability improves, manager will use idle cash for paying 
debt. 
2.2. Initial Perspective Regarding Interaction of Strategic Decision with Capital              
Structure 
The first paper about the relationship between strategic decisions with firm‟s 
capital structure was proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They found that owner-
manager would issue bond (debt) then decided to invest in certain project. Since owner-
manager has a limited liability or obligation, thus investment risk was held by 
bondholders rather than by equity holders (owner-manager). When investment decision 
has been made after issuing bond, then equity holders may take “high risk and grow 
strategies.” If the return from investment is low or facing a bankruptcy, the risk laid on 
bondholders shoulder. 
Brander and Lewis (1986) examined the capital structure using “game theory” 
perspective. They illustrated the game as a “two-stage sequential duopoly game,” where 
2 firms choose capital structure on the first step and then arranged the output on the 
second step. When the high risk increase the incentive to accept high risk strategy, then 
the 2 firms will adopt high debt as a signal to their competitors that they will produce 
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high risk output on the second step. Finally, the two firms will reach the equilibrium 
stage. Both firms took high risk strategy with net-effect similar worst.
1
  
2.3. Modern Perspective Regarding Interaction of Strategic Decision with Capital 
Structure 
There were so many researchers have studied empirically regarding capital 
structure such as: Santi & Ruslan (2006); Bevan & Danbold (2001); Purba (2001); 
Fatemi et.al. (1997); Indrawati (1997); Rajan & Zingales (1995); Demirgüç-Kunt et.al. 
(1994); and Homaefar et.al. (1994). Barton and Gordon (1987) initially tried to explore 
whether capital structure had strategic implication to firm value, then Harris and Raviv 
(1991) did a similar research. They found that different strategic orientation (strategic 
diversification chosen by firms) tended to have different debt level. They also found that 
there was a significant interaction between strategy and finance variables. This proved 
that finance variables and capital structure may be influenced by strategies taken by 
firms. 
Strategy as a predictor of capital structure has been developing when research in 
this area accelerated by, and the literature of strategic management has been shifting 
from industrial structure mainstream to firm‟s heterogenity mainstream. The firm 
heterogenity mainstraem initially proposed by Penrose (1959), and become the initial 
theory of resource-based. The resource-based view became popular in the-1980es 
(Schendel, 1994). The resource-based theory focus on imperfect competition market 
that cause the heterogenity of resources distribution among firms (Barney, 1991).  This 
theory may cause some firms have competitive advantages (Hunt, 1997). 
The heterogeneity perspective in capital structure has been shown by the 
application of transaction cost economics framework (Williamson, 1988). This 
perspective stressed that corporate governance was influenced by the characteristics of 
assets owned by firms. Even though, in general, firms prefer debt financing than equity 
financing, the number of specialized assets and intangible assets owned by firms will 
create cost of debt financing higher than governance cost of equity. Specialized assets 
and intangible assets are difficult to exchange and their collateral values are also low.
2
 
Based on transaction cost literature, Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) examined whether the 
size of intangible capital has a significant contribution in explaining leverage level 
variations. If the correlation found, it indicated there is a strategy, meaning that 
intangible assets owned by firms will influence capital structure taken by firms. By 
using panel data and variance decomposition regression model, they showed that 
industry effects and time effects had a small impact in deciding capital structure; 
compare to firm‟s intangible assets variables and firm‟s heterogenity variables.  
Kochhar (1996) who studied transaction cost economics regarding capital 
structure in the field of strategic management, argued that LBO (leverage buyout) has a 
tendency happened to the firms that own non-unique assets and has a low investment 
opportunity. The less of specialized assets owned by firms could cause the low of 
governance cost for obtaining source of funds from debt. By implementing the 
                                                 
1
 This theory is Cournot oligopoly model, where the company has an incentive to produce bigger output 
and will push the competitors to produce less. 
2
 In the economy with high bankruptcy cost, the value of special assets and intangible assets will easily 
diminish or even dissappear when a firm approaches to bankruptcy condition. 
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transaction cost framework, Kochhar and Hitt (1998) were able to prove empirically 
that firm strategic financing and diversification strategic chosen have a reciprocal 
relationship. Empirical study of transaction cost done by Simerly dan Li (2000), which 
inserted agency theory elements and the dinamics of environment, found that most of 
creditors were risk averse, and strategic cost from debt financing will increase in 
accordance to the increase of environment uncertainty, so equity financing was more 
interested than debt financing. 
 
2.4. Innovation and Capital Structure 
Some new studies regarding interaction between innovation strategies with 
capital structure showed that innovation strategy become determinant of capital 
structure. Jordan, Lowe, and Taylor (1998) that used generic strategies typology from 
Porter found that innovation strategy was associated with low debt ratio, and cost 
leadership strategy had a higher debt level. The similar research from Vincente-Lorente 
(2001) found that there was a negative association (correlation) between investment in 
R&D and leverage. Investment in R&D will create intangible assets and intangible 
assets may not be used as collateral in debt financing (Long & Malitz, 1985; Rajan & 
Zingales 1995; and Santi, 2002). The interrelated between R&D and leverage is still in 
interested question. If R&D and leverage have a negative correlation because R&D 
investment will create intangible assets that can not be used as collateral, then why the 
intensity of R&D investment still become a significant leverage predictor after 
controlling intangible assets variable (see Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2000)? 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2000) mentioned that, as on going expenses, R&D 
tends to become a minor line item except for some outliers. 
In this research, it can be proposed that a firm‟s R&D intensity relative to its 
competitor in the industry was an indication of how important innovation strategy for 
that firm. High R&D expenditure can not guarantee that the firm already be an effective 
innovator. For sure, higher investment in R&D compare to its competitor means the 
firm try to compete based on innovation strategy. The high investment in R&D compare 
to its competitor at the same industry indicated that the firm tries to become a good 
innovator, and it is predicted that this firm will maintain low leverage level. Cyert dan 
March (1963) proposed a preposition that organizational slack made entrepreneurs 
created innovations. They suggest that the different between costs to maintain 
organization with its environment resources through coalition (e.g., organizational 
slack) could be sources of funds for innovation activities. Organizational slack was 
based on financial proxy, included leverage (see Singh, 1986; Zajac et al., 1991, Nohria 
and Gulati, 1996; Davis and Staut, 1992; Zajac et al., 1991; Brealey and Mayers, 1996).  
The firms competing based on innovation strategy have to be innovated 
continuously. The needs of doing innovation continuously make financial slack become 
important for three reasons: first reason, Froot, Scharfstain, and Stein (1993) disclosed 
that cash flow volatility has a potential to damage R&D investment as a strategy to 
reach competitive position. Maintaining R&D investment level to be smooth and sustain 
is a key factor for innovator. Dierickx dan Cool (1989) argued that maintaining a certain 
rate of R&D investment in a certain interval period will increase bigger knowledge 
accumulation compare to invest in R&D twice but for half of interval period. Thus, 
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R&D expenditures can not be let fluctuated with cash flow fluctuation, and financial 
slack can help to isolate or reduce cash flow volatility. R&D investment should be kept 
at a certain rate even though the firm in a difficult condition. 
The second reason, financial slack become important related to firm new 
product. After creating new products for market, effective innovators need certain 
money to launch the new products. Without financial slack, big expenses to launch new 
products may cause the firm „bloodless‟, and this may make entrepreneurs cancel the 
capital investment for those new products (Bromiley, 1991).  
The third reason, some researchers (e.g., Huber, 1991; Kogut dan Zander, 1992; 
and Karim & Mitchell, 2000) suggested that the firms use acquisition strategy for 
developing their stock of knowledge. Through acquisition, the firm can increase its 
competitive position, and compete by using innovation strategy. The availability of 
financial slack can help firms to accelerate in doing acquisition on time. 
Based on the above explainations, it can be estimeted that the firm which has 
high intangible assets (e.g., accumulation knowledge) will not make a significant debt. 
R&D intensity can be used as a proxy for intangible assets owned by firms. The firm 
that will compete through innovation strategy will provide financial slack as a strategic 
imperative, so that firm will not create a big debt to retain its financial slack in a safety 
level. Innovation strategy is important depending on whether the firm want to be an 
innovator, fast follower, or low-cost mass producer. The firms that choose to compete 
through innovation generally choose capital structure that creates suitable financial 
slack.  
Simerly and Li (2000) found that mismatch between capital structures with the 
dinamic of firm environment will create a negative impact for firm value. To maintain 
the harmony of capital structure with the dinamic of firm‟s environment, the firm needs 
a suitable financial slack. The firm that choose to compete through innovation strategy 
should maintain suitable financial slack, if not, it is difficult for them to be an innovator 
(doing R&D continuously) in the dinamic environment of competition. It can be 
predicted the negative correlation between innovation strategy and leverage related to 
its impact to firm‟s performances. This prediction indicated that the firm which running 
innovation strategy but still maintains a high level of debt will pay a high cost for the 
imbalances between strategy and capital structure. Based on the above arguments, the 
hypothesis proposes for this research is: 
H1: The more focus the firm to its innovation strategy, the lower the leverage ratio.  
Previous researchers such as Hovakimian et al. (2000) found a strong 
relationship between R&D (proxied by firm‟s R&D intensity deviation to its average 
industry) and leverage. Thus far, there was no publication of research result inserted 
R&D intensity together with control variable the existence of tangible assets. 
Researchers believed there was a strong relationship between R&D intensity and 
leverage, and this relationship is important to the firm financial slack position. 
This research proposed that firms retaining financial slack as their strategic 
imperative will follow the pecking order theory. Using this proposition, it can be 
predicted the negative relationship between profitability and leverage. The firm will pay 
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debt when the profitability is high, and create debt when the profitability is low. The 
firm that assume financial slack is not part of strategic imperative, may parallel with 
pecking order theory. Nevertheless, the researchers believe that the negative relationship 
is not that strong compare to that firm that implement innovation strategy. The 
improvement of profitability is not directly pushing innovator firm to reduce leverage. 
The firm that focus on innovation strategy and maintain its suitable financial slack 
position will tend to shift its cash or its profit to be used for supporting its innovation 
strategy. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) admitted the probability of interaction 
between innovation strategy and leverage to influence capital structure. Based on the 
above descriptions, the second hypothesis proposed is: 
H2: The more important the innovation strategy by firm, the negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage become stronger.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Dependent Variable 
To examine the hypotesis, the dependent variable used is firm‟s leverage level 
(LEV), that calculated by dividing debt book value with firm‟s total assets. The firm‟s 
capital structure was measured as the ratio of debt to total assets and will be calculated 
as all fixed charge debt obligations and preferred stock divided by total assets. We then 
calculated the debt to equity ratio for each firm in each year of the 15-years period 
1990-2005.  The study assessed the leverage based on realized economic performance 
rather than the market value of debt and assets, which is influenced by investor 
expectations about the firm‟s future financial performance and general market 
prospects.  
 
3.2 Independent Variables and Control variables 
  
There were two types variables for this research, namely, firm‟s level variables 
(these variables may change in value among firms, industries, and periods, the notation 
is ijt), and industry level variables (these variables may change in value among firms, 
industries, and periods, the notation is jt). Independent variables and control variables 
used in this research are: 
a. Independent variables. Primary independent variables used in this research is the 
proxy of how important innovation strategy by firm (INOijt). The researchers 
believed that the important of innovation strategy is not reflected by absolute 
R&D expenditures, but R&D expenditures relative to their competitors at the 
same industry. Innovation strategy (INOijt) was measured by R&D intensity 
calculated as all costs incurred by the firm to develop new products and services 
divided by total sales, then divided by average R&D intensity of it‟s industry. The 
firm‟s R&D intensity was then compared to its industry peers to capture a distinct 
strategy dimension indicating the importance the firm assigns to innovation 
(O‟Brien, 2003). Hence, we calculated the Innovation (INOijt) for each firms 
every year in the sample, averaged the ratio within industry over the 15-year 
period 1990-2005, and standardized the firm measures within the industries 
identified by their two-digit SIC codes. This procedure captured the relative 
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emphasis the firms put on innovation as a strategic approach compared to peers 
within their own industries. 
b. Control variables. Control variables in this research are used to control the 
influence of other variables mentioned in previous research that influence capital 
structure (see Santi, 2002; Vicente-Lorente, 2001; Bevan & Danbold, 2001; 
Purba, 2001; Simerly & Li, 2000; Hovakimian at al., 2000; Booth et al., 2000; 
Opler et al.,1999; Berger et al., 1997; Indrawati, 1997; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 1994, 1996, 1998; Harris & Raviv, 1990, 1991; and Titman 
& Wessel, 1988).  
 
The following are control variables that may influence capital structure:  
 
a. R&D intensity (RDIijt), measured by dividing firm‟s R&D expenditures with 
firm‟s sales value each year. This control variable is a common proxy used by 
researcher in measuring firm R&D intensity. 
b. Advertising intensity (AIijt), measured by dividing firm‟s advertising 
expenditures with firm‟s sales value each year.  
c. Firm‟s size (SIZEijt), measured by calculating natural logarithm of firm‟s total 
assets each year. 
d. Firm‟s profitability (PROijt), measured by dividing operational income excluding 
depreciation and amortization with firm‟s total assets. 
e. Capital intensity (CINijt), measured by dividing total assets book value with 
firm‟s sales value. 
f. Tangible Asset (TANijt), measured by dividing net total fixed assets (net 





 The whole data are yearly audited firm‟s financial statements from 1990-2005. 
Considerations of sample firms chosen are: 
a. Manufacturing firms listed listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange (ISX) 
previously the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) since 1990-2005. 
b. If in the sub manufacturing industry, there are more than two suitable sample 
firms, those firms will be dropped, because 2 samples in each industry is not 
sufficient in calculating variable data related to innovation strategy in the 
industry. 
 
Based on the above considerations, there were 67 manufacturing firms matched the 
criteria from population of 155 manufacturing firms listed in the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. The total numbers of observations were 1072 observations. Since there were 
missing data, so the number of observations can be run were 1047. 
 
3.4 Analysis Method  
 
As mentioned previously, there were two hypothesis will be examined 
econometrically. Before testing the hypothesis, data pattern will be checked. The data 
will be checked by multicollinearity test, homogeneity test, autocorrelation test, and 
panel model specification test (Hausman specification test). After the data fulfill the 
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requirements in multiple regressions, the regression coefficient will be interpreted. 
There are two multiple regression equations used to test the hypothesis. To test the 
hypothesis 1, the multiple regressions used is: 
 
LEVijt =  + 1INOijt + 2RDIijt + 3AIijt + 4SIZEijt + 5PROijt + 6CINijt + 7TANijt 
+ijt                 …………………………….. …………………………… equation 
1. 
 
To test the hypothesis 2, the multiple regression equation used is: 
 
LEVijt =  + 1INOijt + (2INOijt▪PROijt) + 3RDIijt + 4AIijt + 5SIZEijt + 6PROijt + 
7CINijt + 8TANijt + ijt       ……. ……………………… equation 2. 
Since there is a cross-sectional heterogeneity, the GLS (generalized least square) 
estimation is used in this study rather than OLS (ordinary least square) estimation. By 
using first order autoregressive in the model, first-order positive serial correlation can 
be removed in the GLS model. After looking at Table 1, the matrix of correlation 
coefficients between the dependent and independent variables, it showed that most of 
cross-correlation terms are fairly small (below 0.3), thus there were no multicollinearity 
problems. 
 
Table 1a. Correlation Matrix – Pooled Sample 
 
 INO RDI AI SIZE PRO CIN TAN 
INO 1.000 0.198 0.047 0.202 -0.014 -0.006 -0.014 
RDI  1.000 -0.004 0.062 -0.029 0.009 0.049 
AI   1.000 0.063 0.023 0.174 -0.053 
SIZE    1.000 -0.146 0.191 0.206 
PRO     1.000 -0.119 -0.152 
CIN      1.000 0.193 
TAN       1.000 
 
Two steps are used in the estimation process. First, pooled GLS regressions are 
estimated. Pooled GLS model might produce bias result due to its failure to control for 
time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity. The pooled GLS model analysis yields 
results that are generally consistent with other cross-sectional results. Based on 
Hausman test, fixed effect GLS models are used in the second step to counter for time-
invariant firm-specific heterogeneity.  
Table 1b. Hausman Specification Test Results 
 
Hausman test for fixed versus random effects for equation 1 
   
   
chi-sqr(7) =   5768.235  
p-value =   0.000000  
   
   
 
Hausman test for fixed versus random effects for equation 2 
   
   
chi-sqr(8) =   321.415  
 12 
p-value =   0.000000  
   
   
 
4. The Results and Discussions 
4.1 Data and sample Description 
 
Sample used in this research implemented data pooling method from year 1990 – 
2005. There were 67 manufacturing firms obtained with 1072 total observations. 
Since some data missing, the total observations become 1047 observations included 
in analysis. Sample statistic descriptive can be seen in Table 2 below. 
Table 2. Summary of Descriptive Statistics – Pooled Data 




Coefficient  Observation  
LEV 0.5794 0.5546 0.3096 0.53 1047 
INO 0.1608 0.0000 0.3191 1.98 1047 
RDI 0.0082 0.0000 0.0584 7.12 1047 
AI 0.0135 0.0000 0.0846 6.27 1047 
SIZE 26.6978 26.4680 1.7407 0.07 1047 
PRO 0.1075 0.0847 0.1652 1.54 1047 
CIN 2.0074 1.3571 3.6257 1.81 1047 
TAN 0.3665 0.3327 0.2093 0.57 1047 
 
Table 2 showed that sample firms in the observation period used average debt 
composition higher than equity in its capital structure. Debts mean is 57.94%, with debt 
median 55.46%. This composition variation is not large enough (coefficient of variation 
is 0.53 below 1. The standard deviation was 30.96%. Larger composition of debt than 
equity indicated that sample firms highly depend on debt financing. This independency 
is parallel with the improvement of banking sector in terms of size and activities. Banks 
are primary sources of fund in Indonesian economy.  
In average, the firms spend 16.08% for R&D from its sales relative to its 
competitor at the same industry as a supporting factor of innovation strategy. Most firms 
implemented innovation strategy at low level with high deviation standard of 31.91%, 
and high variation coefficient of 1.98. This means that innovation strategy implemented 
by sample firms in the same industry is heterogenous. Meaning, eventhough, the 
average of INO variable in sample firms is low, there were some firms concentrated in 
implementing innovation strategy as a primary strategy in competing in its industry. 
Variable RDI told the same story. The average spending of R&D cost was 0.8% from 
sales, with coefficient of variation 7.12. Investment intensity is still low. There are firms 
spent a lot of money in R&D for innovation strategy, on the other hand, there are some 
firms did not spend money in R&D at all. The high variation in R&D spending means 
that there were still a lot of firms not implementing innovation strategy. The firms that 
do not implement innovation strategy may take the follower strategy. 
From statistic descriptive, it showed that mean and median of advertising cost 
(AI) from sample firms are 1.35% and zero percent respectively. The deviation standard 
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is 8.46% with coefficient of variation 6.27. Higher standard deviation from its average 
and coefficient of variation showed that advertising cost of sample firms is varied. In 
fact, there are some firms spending a lot of advertising cost, but there are some firms did 
not spend advertising at all 
In terms of size, the size of sample firms is quite similar, with coefficient of 
variation 0.07. Lower standard deviations from its average showed that the size of 
sampe firms is almost the same. The average fixed assets composition from total assets 
is 36.65% with low coeffient of variation (0.57). This also indicated that sample firms 
fixed asset composition in their total asset is similar among sample firms.  
For profitability of sample firms, it showed that the mean and median are 
10.75% and 8.47% respectively. The standard deviation is 1.54% with coefficient of 
variation 1.54. The mean of capital intensity (CIN) is 2.0074 with high coefficient of 
variation (1.81).  These results indicated that although quite similar in size, the firms‟ 
profitability and capital intensity invested in assets to reach certain sales level is varied 
among sample firms.  
 
4.2 Description Based on Industry Classification 
From Table 3 debt composition in capital structure between industries is varied. Seven 
(7) out of 14 industries had average debt more than 60%. Chemical and allied products 
industry has the largest debt. The variation of leverage within each industry is not 
substantial. It is indicated by the coefficient of variation of leverage variable below 1, 
except for tobacco manufactures industry.  
In terms of implementation of innovation strategy (INO), it is found that the 
variation within each industry is significant which indicated by coefficient of variation 
of this variable above 1. The biggest variation is in tobacco manufactures industry. 
There is a unique situation for R&D intensity (RDI) variable. Six (6) out of 14 
industries observed indicates that the coefficient of variation equal zero.  




Table 3 Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Each  Industry  
 Food and Baverage Tobacco manufactures 









LEV 0.4855 0.4748 0.2252 0.46 128 0.4717 0.4299 1.1640 2.47 48 
INO 0.1598 0.0000 0.3216 2.01 128 0.1458 0.0000 2.0040 13.74 48 
R&D 0.0012 0.0000 0.0058 4.83 128 0.0011 0.0000 2.9075 0.00 48 
AI 0.0280 0.0025 0.0750 2.68 128 0.0179 0.0000 0.9347 52.24 48 
SIZE 26.3845 26.6815 1.6140 0.06 128 28.2990 28.5953 0.3779 0.01 48 
PRO 0.1273 0.1143 0.1144 0.90 128 0.1873 0.1913 0.3452 1.84 48 
CIN 2.3962 1.1416 7.7528 3.24 128 0.9472 0.8751 2.7110 2.86 48 
TAN 0.4043 0.3777 0.1859 0.46 128 0.2247 0.2266 0.1035 0.46 48 
 Textille Mill Products Apparel and Other Textille Products 
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LEV 0.5957 0.5913 0.2896 0.49 96 0.6605 0.6047 0.2578 0.39 110 
INO 0.1147 0.0000 0.2741 2.39 96 0.1274 0.0000 0.2634 2.07 110 
R&D 0.0008 0.0000 0.0021 2.63 96 0.0172 0.0000 0.1646 9.57 110 
AI 0.0009 0.0000 0.0017 1.89 96 0.0046 0.0000 0.0126 2.74 110 
SIZE 26.8617 26.5615 1.2262 0.05 96 26.5297 26.0766 1.4332 0.05 110 
PRO 0.0625 0.0563 0.1037 1.66 96 0.0780 0.0653 0.1225 1.57 110 
CIN 1.7188 1.5499 0.7684 0.45 96 1.7188 1.3700 1.5518 0.90 110 
TAN 0.4994 0.5118 0.1667 0.33 96 0.3618 0.3386 0.2076 0.57 110 
 Paper and Allied Products Chemical and Allied Products 









LEV 0.7857 0.6739 0.3644 0.46 48 0.8740 0.6383 0.5498 0.63 48 
INO 0.1250 0.0000 0.3342 2.67 48 0.0417 0.0000 0.2019 4.84 48 
R&D 0.0018 0.0000 0.0048 2.67 48 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 48 
AI 0.0003 0.0000 0.0015 5.00 48 0.0006 0.0000 0.0011 1.83 48 
SIZE 28.5131 28.6517 2.0740 0.07 48 27.6530 27.4381 1.5145 0.05 48 
PRO 0.0516 0.0474 0.1106 2.14 48 0.0829 0.0853 0.0871 1.05 48 
CIN 4.7737 3.9179 5.4412 1.14 48 2.5171 2.1366 2.2412 0.89 48 
TAN 0.5991 0.6265 0.2293 0.38 48 0.4657 0.4528 0.2096 0.45 48 
 Adhesive Plastic and Glass Product 









LEV 0.2534 0.2262 0.1169 0.46 64 0.5031 0.4662 0.2345 0.47 64 
INO 0.2236 0.0000 0.3542 1.58 64 0.1719 0.0000 0.3786 2.20 64 
R&D 0.0005 0.0000 0.0009 1.80 64 0.0054 0.0000 0.0156 0.00 64 
AI 0.0015 0.0000 0.0038 2.53 64 0.0008 0.0000 0.0023 2.88 64 
SIZE 25.1880 25.2257 0.6986 0.03 64 26.3177 26.2668 1.4613 0.06 64 
PRO 0.1205 0.1124 0.0894 0.74 64 0.1189 0.1017 0.0641 0.54 64 
CIN 1.5283 1.4912 0.5959 0.39 64 1.6316 1.4295 0.8952 0.55 64 








Table 3 Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Each  Industry (cont.) 
 Cement Metal and Allied Product 









LEV 0.6089 0.6058 0.3312 0.54 48 0.6186 0.6431 0.3725 0.60 77 
INO 0.3333 0.2210 0.3563 1.07 48 0.1708 0.0000 0.2952 1.73 77 
R&D 0.0311 0.0314 0.0325 1.05 48 0.0188 0.0000 0.0472 0.00 77 
AI 0.0024 0.0001 0.0058 2.42 48 0.0002 0.0000 0.0008 4.00 77 
SIZE 29.0618 29.5181 0.9815 0.03 48 25.4953 25.4389 1.1721 0.05 77 
PRO 0.0746 0.0717 0.0539 0.72 48 0.0863 0.0640 0.1202 1.39 77 
CIN 4.8774 3.2357 6.6403 1.36 48 1.2512 0.9924 0.9398 0.75 77 
TAN 0.5856 0.6323 0.2395 0.41 48 0.3063 0.2822 0.1838 0.60 77 
 Cable Electric and Electronic Equipment 
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LEV 0.6770 0.6042 0.3053 0.45 64 0.5329 0.5438 0.1910 0.36 63 
INO 0.2344 0.0000 0.3691 1.57 64 0.2233 0.0002 0.3888 1.74 63 
R&DI 0.0122 0.0000 0.0183 1.50 64 0.0313 0.0001 0.0625 0.00 63 
AI 0.0020 0.0000 0.0036 1.80 64 0.0334 0.0000 0.2503 7.49 63 
SIZE 26.2796 26.3264 0.6204 0.02 64 26.4307 25.9812 1.3053 0.05 63 
PRO 0.0567 0.0618 0.0668 1.18 64 0.1522 0.0878 0.4871 3.20 63 
CIN 1.5527 1.1697 1.3014 0.84 64 1.3942 0.9906 1.2355 0.89 63 
TAN 0.3369 0.2930 0.1633 0.48 64 0.1888 0.1594 0.1443 0.76 63 
 Authomotive and Allied Products Pharmaceuticals 









LEV 0.6083 0.6114 0.2512 0.41 126 0.5327 0.5168 0.2596 0.49 63 
INO 0.1014 0.0000 0.2733 2.70 126 0.1836 0.0000 0.3377 1.84 63 
R&D 0.0016 0.0000 0.0079 4.94 126 0.0010 0.0000 0.0019 0.00 63 
AI 0.0122 0.0000 0.0502 4.11 126 0.0790 0.0000 0.1844 2.33 63 
SIZE 26.9912 26.5640 1.8985 0.07 126 25.7415 25.6467 1.7216 0.07 63 
PRO 0.1066 0.0841 0.1338 1.26 126 0.2225 0.2224 0.1601 0.72 63 
CIN 1.9857 1.3793 2.2590 1.14 126 1.1969 0.7445 1.2674 1.06 63 
TAN 0.3380 0.3286 0.1605 0.47 126 0.2019 0.1847 0.1149 0.57 63 
                               
 
C. Hypothesis Testing and Discussion 
Table 4 presents the regression result of equation 1 in testing the first 
hypothesis. At the aggregate level, we find that the adjusted R
2 
measure of the 
regression is 87.82%.  The findings of the influence of each independent variable 
will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Innovation Strategy: This study finds a significant negative relationship 
between innovation strategy and leverage. This finding is in line with Vicente-
Lorente (2001), Hovakimian et.al (2000), and Hitt (1998) studies and parallel to 
Jensen and Mecling (1976) opinion. This result described that firms used innovation 
strategy will create the availability of financial slack as strategic imperative. This 
also supports collateral value explanation. This result suggests that firms will not 
create debt vastly to maintain their safe financial slack level. The availability of 
financial slack can make them innovated freely and become innovators in their 
industry. 
The significant and negative influence of innovation strategy toward capital 
structure was also found in Vicente-Lorente (2001) and Hovakimian et.al (2000) 
studies. Nevertheless, it is needed to control the existence of the intangible assets in 
the model, so the interpretations of strong relationship between innovation strategy 
and leverage more related to the strategic importance of firms financial slack 
positions. The firm‟s R&D expenditures relative to their competitors at the same 
industry (INO) can be a proxy for firm intangible stock. That is why in this research 
tangibility of firm assets (FAN variable) is also included as a control variable. From 




Table 4. Estimation Result for Equation 1. 
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Dependent Variable: (LEV?)   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
      
      
C  0.056464 0.123963 0.455487 0.6489 
INO? 1 -0.019443 0.010874 -1.788094 0.0741* 
AI? 2 -0.041435 0.042242 -0.980879 0.3269 
RDI? 3 0.000764 0.040225 0.018996 0.9848 
SIZE? 4 0.020100 0.004532 4.434856 0.0000*** 
PRO? 5 -0.043038 0.018725 -2.298408 0.0218** 
CIN? 6 -2.04E-05 0.001059 -0.019306 0.9846 
TAN? 7 0.067986 0.025602 2.655530 0.0081*** 
AR(1)  0.710687 0.021212 33.50368 0.0000*** 
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.887267     Mean dependent var 0.843206 
Adjusted R-squared 0.878209     S.D. dependent var 0.463307 
S.E. of regression 0.161687     Sum squared resid 24.07756 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.869955    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.749769     Mean dependent var 0.592705 
Sum squared resid 24.27791     Durbin-Watson stat 1.908686 
     
     
*** denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
** denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. 
* denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
The multivariate-fixed effect GLS regression results show that the coefficient 
of RDI (as a proxy of R&D intensity variable) is positive but not significant. This 
result suggests that, in Indonesia, especially manufacturing firms, the existence of 
R&D Intensity is not a determinant variable in deciding firms‟ debt level. As 
mention before, six (6) of 14 industries observed showed that coefficient of variation 
in RDI equal to zero. Most of previously cited research on capital structure had found 
negative impact of RDI on leverage (Hovakimian et al., 2000; and Vicente-Lorente, 
2001). As discussed in literature reviews section, considerable firm‟s expenditure in 
R&D does not guareantee that a firm will become an effective innovator. 
Nevertheless, a firm that invests substantial money in R&D compared to its 
competitor at the same industry is more possible to compete based on innovation 
strategy. Our finding in this variable confirms and strengthens this statement. 
However, the current study inclusion of a variable that explicitly proxies for the 
importance of innovativeness, as well as controls for the tangibility of assets, the lack 
of significant impact of RDI on leverage is not surprising. 
 17 
 It is difficult to predict the effect of advertising intensity to leverage. From 
Table 4, it is showed that the coefficient of advertising intensity is negative but 
insignificant. This result suggests that, in sample firms, the existence of advertising 
intensity variable is not a determinant variable in deciding firms‟ debt level. Some 
previous study had found a negative effect of advertising intensity on leverage 
(Hovakimian at al., 2000; Berger et al., 1997), while others had found either no 
effect, or a positive effect (Vicente-Lorente, 2001). Similarly, it was difficult to 
predict the effect of capital intensity would have. Estimation result in Table 4 
showed that the coefficient of capital intensty is negative but insignificant 
In terms of other three control variables (SIZE, PRO, and TAN), the positive 
effect of size, the negative effect of profitability, and the positive effect of tangibility 
on leverage were all consistent with other previous studies (Santi, 2002; Bevan & 
Danbold, 2001; Booth et.al, 2000; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Balakrishnan et al., 
1993) This study finds that size of the firm has significant positive influence to 
leverage. The positive influence of size to leverage ratio confirms the argument that 
larger firms tend to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy and the direct 
cost of issuing debt is smaller. This study also finds that tangibility of assets of the 
firm has significant positive influence to leverage.This also suggests that firm with 
more tangible assets tend to borrow more than firm with less tangible assets. For 
profitability variable, this study still can find the negative and significant influence. 
The second hypothesis of this research is tested by estimating the coefficient of 
INO*PRO in the equation 2. The result of second hyphotesis 2 that examines the 
influence of interaction between profitability and innovation strategy (INO*PRO) 
toward capital structure (LEV) is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 showed that the coefficient of INO*PRO was -0.401954 and 
significant. Thus, this study result support the hypothesis of the more important the 
innovation strategy by firm, the stronger the negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage. The result in Table 5 also showed that the influence of 
profitability (PRO) toward capita structur (LEV) is negative and significant. This 
suggests that a firm will pay its debt when its profitability is high and creates debt 
when its profitability is low.  
If a firm assume a financial slack is not a strategic imperative, it s capital 
structure decision will parallel with pecking-order theory where states that if a firm is 
profitable, it will reduce its debt. Previous studies such as Santi (2002) and Purba 
(2001) found empirical evidence of this negative influence of profitability toward 
leverage of Indonesian companies, and their findings confirmed the pecking-order 
theory. Further more, our study able to prove the prediction that the negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage is not as strong as that of the firms 
pursuing innovation strategy. As it can be seen in Table 5, the magnitude of negative 
influence of profitability toward leverage increased from 7 = -0.076352 if the firm 
did not pursue the innovation strategy as its main strategy to 7 + 2 = -0.076352 + (-
0.401954 x INO) if it did. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) also suggest that there is an interaction 
between innovation strategy and profitability in explaining capital structure variation. 
The improvement in profitability is not directly inducing the firm to teduce its 
leverage. If firms have a real strategic orientation to innovation, they will tend to 
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shift its cash from it profit that improving to the innovation strategy activities, not to 
pay debt. 
Table 5. Estimation Result for Equation 2 
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Dependent Variable: (LEV?)   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
      
      
C  -0.643770 0.118396 -5.437427 0.0000*** 
INO? 1 -0.043371 0.021655 -2.002874 0.0455** 
INO?*PRO? 2 -0.401954 0.135541 -2.965564 0.0031*** 
AI? 3 -0.030642 0.060000 -0.510707 0.6097 
RDI? 4 0.079796 0.070283 1.135352 0.2565 
SIZE? 5 0.043044 0.004556 9.446944 0.0000*** 
PRO? 6 -0.076352 0.027217 -2.805322 0.0051*** 
CIN? 7 -0.004103 0.001673 -2.452918 0.0143** 
TAN? 8 0.250571 0.031383 7.984338 0.0000*** 
      
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.730382     Mean dependent var 0.785153 
Adjusted R-squared 0.710188     S.D. dependent var 0.402483 
S.E. of regression 0.216673     Sum squared resid 46.38399 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.781611    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.523458     Mean dependent var 0.582126 
Sum squared resid 48.11620     Durbin-Watson stat 1.663423 
 
*** denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
** denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. 




Conclusions of this research are: 
1. Innovation strategy has a negative impact on capital structure. A firm that 
chooses to use innovation strategy in its industry tends to have less debt portion 
than equity in its capital structure. This firm tends to have suitable financial 
slack in order to maintain its innovation activities. 
2. This research also finds that the firm profitability level has a negative impact on 
capital structure. This negative impact becomes more substantial when a firm 
implemented innovation strategy.  
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The opportunities for future research are: 
1. A strategy chosen by a firm depends on the dynamic of environtmen of 
competition faced by a firm. In a dynamic environtment, a firm should move 
fastly to adapt to the fast changing environtment and choose an innovation 
strategy to win the competition. To be flexible in implementing innovation 
strategy, a firm shoud have sufficient sources of funds. Meaning, a firm should 
match or balance among alternative source of funds exist. If not, this will 
influence the firm performance. In a dynamic environtment, the next reseach 
proposed is what impacts of intractions between innovation strategy and capital 
structure on firms‟ performances would be. 
2. The next researches that can be explored are the relationship between capital 
structure and firm‟s performance. Is the firm‟s performance influence the cspitsl 
structure decision, or visa-versa?  To answer these proposals, the next 
researchers can use structural equation model (SEM) method. 
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